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An open question in market microstructure is whether ‘informed’ traders
have an advantage due to access to private, inside, information; or due to a
superior ability to process public information. In this article we attempt to
answer this question with data from a sports betting exchange taken during
play. Uniquely, this allows us to time-stamp information events to the
nearest second, and to ensure we are observing all relevant information
regarding the value of an asset. We find evidence of inside information but
not of a superior ability to process public information. The first finding
suggests that a subset of the betting population are observing the action
before the wider public (possibly due to delays in the television signal), and
betting using this informational advantage.
I. Introduction
There is a rich history of empirical betting market
studies to explore financial market theories. In
particular, betting markets have proved a popular
setting for tests of market efficiency, and interest has
been focused on a persistent anomaly: the favourite/
long-shot bias, where returns on favourites exceed
those on long-shots.1 In this article we use betting
market data to test two hypotheses from market
microstructure.
The initial motivation for market microstructure
research was a realization that Walrasian equilibrium
was a poor characterization of the type of trade
carried out on major stock exchanges.2 In a contin-
uous time trading environment an intermediary is
either contracted to, or can extract profits from,
the provision of liquidity. The costs of this interme-
diation distort the quoted bid and ask prices from the
asset’s fundamental value. Analysis of the formation
of price, which had previously focused on the
fundamentals of the asset, now needed to include
the payoffs and preferences of the intermediary.
In the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model, the
specialist market-maker trades an asset with a pop-
ulation composed of informed traders, who have
private, inside, information on the fundamental value
of the asset, and liquidity traders, who trade ran-
domly. A bid–ask spread is charged in order to offset
losses to the informed with gains from liquidity
traders. This is the adverse selection component of
the bid–ask spread. Extrapolating this result, if a
subset of the trading population has private infor-
mation on the contents of a forthcoming public
announcement, then the bid–ask spread will increase
prior to, and during, the announcement.
Kim and Verrecchia (1994) endogenize the acqui-
sition of private information by adding a trading
1 The first observation of the bias, in Griffith (1949), predated the market efficiency literature. Ottaviani and Sørensen (2008)
survey the technical explanations of the bias. For a more general survey of market efficiency in betting markets, see Vaughan
Williams (2005).
2Garman (1976) was the author to coin the term ‘market microstructure’. For a review of the market microstructure
literature, see O’Hara (1995), Madhavan (2000), Biais et al. (2005) and, for empirical work, Hasbrouck (2007).
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group which processes information. Their informa-
tion advantage materializes after information on the
asset is publicly announced, as they are able to create
private information via their analysis. The specialist
market-maker will therefore increase the bid–ask
spread after a public announcement to offset losses to
the information processors. This model interestingly
proposes that information disclosure can increase,
rather than limit, adverse selection if the signal
received from information is noisy.
In the context of information arrival, the two
models lead to the following noncompeting
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The adverse selection component of
the bid–ask spread arises due to asymmetric infor-
mation prior to public information arrival.
Hypothesis 2: The adverse selection component of
the bid–ask spread arises due to asymmetric abilities
to process symmetric information after public infor-
mation arrival.
A number of authors have examined the bid–ask
spread in financial markets around significant infor-
mation events in order to distinguish between the two
hypotheses. Lee et al. (1993) find that spreads widen
both before and after earnings announcements,
although the effect after an announcement is short-
lived. Krinsky and Lee (1996) decompose the bid–ask
spread into its adverse selection, transaction cost and
inventory-control components, and find that the
adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread
increases both prior to and after an earnings
announcement. Gajewski (1999), in a study of earn-
ings announcements on the Bourse de Paris, finds
greater support for Hypothesis 2.
In our study we examine bid–ask spreads on a
betting exchange, both before a sporting event, when
information arrival is infrequent, and during an
event, when information arrival is highly frequent.
The advantage of such a setting is that information
arrival can be time-stamped to the nearest second.
Previously, information arrival in this context was
identified only to the nearest minute (Gajewski,
1999). In addition, while the announcement of
information in a financial market does not preclude
the prior existence, or subsequent arrival, of private
information not observed by the public, in a sporting
environment, once play has begun, all information
relevant to the value of a betting asset is observable.
This allows us to correctly isolate the effects of
information arrival. A final advantage lies in the fact
that betting market assets have a reasonable proba-
bility of default. The importance of new information
for the value of a betting asset is greater than new
information in a financial market, where the prob-
abilility of default, regardless of the information
content, is minimal. Adverse selection in a betting
market should therefore be more pronounced.
The betting price data we use in this article is taken
from a tennis match. Tennis is chosen because
information events are of sufficient length and can
be foreseen. For example, a tie-break is often
important in determining the outcome of a match
and takes place over a sufficient period of time for
bettors to realize the importance of the play whilst it
occurs.3 In contrast, a goal is important in determin-
ing the outcome of a football match but is short lived
and cannot necessarily be foreseen. In our study,
information periods are separated into four, with a
low-information period prior to play and during rain
breaks; an intermediate information period whilst the
match is in play; a high-information period during tie-
breaks and a post-high information period immedi-
ately following a tie-break. We find that the adverse
selection component of the bid–ask spread increases
during our high-information period, but decreases,
even relative to our intermediate information period,
immediately after the high-information period. This
lends support to Hypothesis 1, but not Hypothesis 2.
This brings us to the question of the nature of
inside information on a betting market. Prior to play
this could take the form of information on the
wellbeing, fitness or determination of the athlete.
Once the match has begun, such information is
typically revealed to the public in the early stages of
play. However, we observe that inside information
increases during a match, and, further, appears to
spike during moments of importance, such as tie-
breaks. In other words, inside information is being
created during a match. We therefore propose that
informed bettors derive their advantage from observ-
ing the action before the rest of the public. Television
pictures typically transmit with a few seconds delay
and therefore bettors with a faster transmission, or
present at the game, are able to trade on an
informational advantage.4 To capitalize on this fleet-
ing advantage, bettors would need to feed this
information into a computer and initiate bets via an
algorithm. In these circumstances, a high-frequency
trading strategy (e.g. trading after each point) would
generate significant returns.
This article is organized as follows. In Section II
we describe the data and present some
3A tie-break is played at the end of a set if the players are tied on six games each. The winner of the tie-break wins the set.
4 As we discuss in Section III, the betting exchange in question does take steps to limit this advantage.
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descriptive statistics. In Section III we outline the
methodology and provide results. Section IV
concludes.
II. Data
The focus of our betting study is the Men’s 2008
Wimbledon Tennis Final, between Roger Federer
and Rafael Nadal. Described afterwards as ‘one of
the greatest finals of a grand-slam tournament’ (The
Times, 8th July 2008), this match attracted a lot of
attention as it pitted the number one ranked player in
the world (Federer) against the number two (Nadal),
in the most prestigious of the grand-slam events. As
an indication of the betting interest, Betfair, a betting
exchange, matched GBP 28 334 894 on Nadal to win
and GBP 20 802 434 on Federer to win.
We obtained Betfair betting price data for this
match from Fracsoft, a company contracted to
market historical pricing data for Betfair. The data
available includes the quoted odds and respective
volumes for each player to win, for 211 minutes and
48 seconds before the match begins, and also the 400
minutes and 44 seconds from the beginning of the
match until the end. This gives us 36 752 seconds of
pricing data for this match. The match itself lasted for
4 hours and 48 minutes but there were two rain
delays, during which betting could continue. Bets on
an exchange can be traded in the form of a back bet
(where the bettor receives the stake plus the odds
if the event occurs) or a lay bet (where a bettor
receives the stake if the event does not occur but is
liable for the odds if it does occur). From these quoted
odds we calculated the back-lay (bid–ask) spread.
As well as a bet on a player to win, bets were traded
on the score, in sets, by which a player would win. We
used this data to identify the timing of tie-breaks.
After a set ends (e.g. after a tie-break) and a
particular set score is no longer possible, bets cease
to be traded. This allowed us to time-stamp the end of
the tie-break. We then calculated the length of the tie-
break with video footage of the match. As a result we
were able to identify the low-information periods
(prior to play or during a rain break), the intermediate
information periods (during play including tie-breaks),
the high-information periods (during a tie-break), and
finally the post-high information periods (immediately
following a tie break).5
As well as this match, we carried out similar
analysis on three matches at an earlier stage of this
tournament. In these cases we did not have video
footage, and so estimated the duration of tie-breaks
as 5 minutes. Our statistical results for these matches
were similar to those we report here, but because we
were not able to cross-check the data with video
footage, we limit the results we report to the 2008
Final.
This best of five set match finished three sets to two
to Nadal. The third and fourth sets both went to a
tie-break, with Federer winning both to stay in the
match. The high-information period consists of
the third set tie-break, which lasted 456 seconds,
and the fourth set tie-break, which lasted 816
seconds. The post-high information period is defined
in our study as the 5 minutes (300 seconds) that
immediately follow each of those tie-breaks.6
The criteria of a relevant betting asset for our study
is as follows. The asset must have been traded during
at least two periods which qualify as high-information
periods and two periods which qualify as post-high
information periods. By this criteria, we analysed four
bets: Federer to win, Nadal to win, Nadal to win 3-2
and Federer to win 3-2. All other set betting
outcomes fell short of that criteria.
Table 1 outlines the descriptive statistics for the
spreads quoted on the four assets. Spreads are
converted into implied probability form. For exam-
ple, if a back bet is quoted at 3-1, then the implied
probability is 1/(3þ 1)¼ 0.25. If the lay bet is quoted
at 4-1, then the implied probability is 1/(4þ 1)¼ 0.2,
which results in a spread of 0.25 0.2¼ 0.05.
More generally, our measure of the bid–ask
spread is
S ¼ 1
Ob þ 1
1
Ol þ 1 ð1Þ
where Ob is the best back odds offered and Ol is the
best lay odds offered.
The average spread is higher, and displays a greater
SD, in the high-information period for all four assets.
The difference is understandably most pronounced in
assets 3 and 4, the set betting assets, which have the
greatest variance in payoff. The average spread in the
post-high information period is lower than the average
spread in the intermediate information period for all
four assets. This appears to suggest that spreads
increase around important information arrival,
but fall quickly once information has been revealed.
5 There are undoubtedly times, other than during a tie-break, which could be classified as high-information periods. We could
also include break-points, set-points and match points. However, these periods are shorter than tie-breaks which may not give
the liquidity providers sufficient time to react to their existence.
6We also classified the post-high information period as 1minute following the tie-break and the results were unaffected.
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This lends support to the Glosten and Milgrom
(1985)-based Hypothesis 1.
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the bid–ask
spread from before play to during play. This figure
represents the bid–ask spread in asset 1. The match
begins at time 12 708 and the bid–ask spread is on
average higher and more volatile after this time. In
the next section we present our empirical model.
III. Methodology and Results
Our aim in this section is to control for the elements
of the bid–ask spread which could be ascribed to
transaction costs, inventory-control effects or a lack
of competition in liquidity provision, and therefore
isolate the adverse selection component. In addition,
we need to control for autocorrelation in the spreads
as the spreads at nearby time periods are not
independent.
To test our two hypotheses, we considered the
following regression model for each of the four assets:
St ¼ 0 þ 1St1 þ 2Vt þ 3Dt þ 4Bt þ 5Pt þ t
ð2Þ
At time t, St is the spread as defined in Equation 1,
St1 the spread at the previous time point, Vt is the
sum of the volume available at the best three back
and lay odds and Dt, Bt and Pt are indicator
variables, determining if t is during a intermediate
period (during the match), a high-information period
(during a tie-break) or a post-high information period
(in the 300 seconds following a tie break), respec-
tively. 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 are fixed coefficients and
t is an error term with the usual Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) assumptions.
We include the spread at the previous time point to
control for temporal dependencies between spreads,
and a measure of volume to control for illiquidity
which can cause spreads to widen irrespective of
adverse selection. We also expect that our measure of
volume controls for inventory-control effects, as the
impact of a liquidity provider’s inventory consider-
ations would be limited in a liquid market.7
In this model 0 has an economic interpretation.
This is the component of the bid–ask spread which
arises regardless of the informational considerations.
This is a positive fixed transaction cost to cover the
0 10 000 20 000 30 000
0.
00
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
08
0.
10
Time
Sp
re
ad
Fig. 1. The bid–ask spread, as defined in Equation 1, for
asset 1 (Nadal to win). The match began at Time^ 12 708
Table 1. The mean bid–ask spread (Equation 1, to 4 d.p.) for asset 1 (Nadal to win), 2 (Federer to win), 3 (Nadal to
win 3-2) and 4 (Federer to win 3-2) as measured in all, low-, intermediate, high- and post-high information periods
Information period 1 2 3 4
All 0.0053 (0.0043) 0.0052 (0.0057) 0.0189 (0.0440) 0.0201 (0.0650)
Low 0.0038 (0.0000) 0.0032 (0.0000) 0.0053 (0.0011) 0.0055 (0.0013)
Intermediate 0.0061 (0.0051) 0.0062 (0.0068) 0.0261 (0.0530) 0.0278 (0.0793)
High 0.0098 (0.0084) 0.0131 (0.0168) 0.0910 (0.1636) 0.1170 (0.2200)
Post-high 0.0052 (0.0032) 0.0046 (0.0033) 0.0243 (0.0235) 0.0233 (0.0297)
Note: SDs are given in parentheses.
7 The inventory-control literature largely assumes that liquidity is provided by a contracted specialist who is obligated to
provide liquidity continuously (Stoll, 1978; Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; O’Hara and Oldfield, 1986). When the liquidity
provider does not have an obligation to trade continuously, as would be the case with a betting limit order trader, they can
maintain a desired exposure to the event by placing market orders. In addition, the effect of inventory on price is transient
and, particularly in a liquid market, should therefore be negligible.
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labour and computing resources involved in
providing liquidity. We also require that 250 as
the bid–ask spread increases as competition, proxied
by volume, decreases.
By Hypothesis 1, we expect that 340 and 440.
When information is arriving, the liquidity providers
should increase the bid–ask spread to guard against
those with prior access to this information. For
Hypothesis 2, we require that 540. That is, the bid–
ask spread is increased immediately after an impor-
tant information event as a subset of the betting
population has superior abilities to process this
information and assess the fundamental value of the
traded bet. In addition, Hypothesis 2 requires 340
as those with superior analytical abilities can put
them to work on smaller information events.
Table 2 reports our results for the estimation of
Equation 2. Diagnostic plots suggest that the model
assumptions are valid. In what follows, ‘significant’
indicates significance at the 5% level and ‘highly
significant’ indicates significance at the 1% level.
B040 for all four assets and highly significant in
three of them, and 250 for all four assets and highly
significant in three of them. As our rationale outlined
above, there is evidence of a fixed transaction cost
component of the bid–ask spread, and that the bid–
ask spread decreases as volume increases.
We find that 340 for all four assets and highly
significant for three of them. This concurs with our
assumption that the arrival of information creates an
adverse selection problem for those providing liquid-
ity. Whether that adverse selection problem is due to
inside information or the ability of certain bettors to
process public information is answered by 4 and 5.
We find that 4 is positive and highly significant for
all four assets. In other words, liquidity providers
increase the bid–ask spread during significant infor-
mation events due to asymmetric information at these
times. This lends support to Hypothesis 1.
On the other hand, we find little support for
Hypothesis 2. 550 for all four assets and significant
for two of them. In other words, the adverse selection
component of the bid–ask spread decreases after a
significant information event. This supports the
traditional view that information disclosure limits
adverse selection by taking away the informational
advantage of the informed.
If bettors are trading on the basis of inside
information, then the question remains as to the
source of such information. Inside information in a
betting market has traditionally been related to the
fitness and determination of the athletes. Once the
match has begun, such information is typically
revealed to the public in the early stages of play. If
this type of inside information was carrying over into
the match, then we would expect little variation in the
adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread
both before and during a match. However, we
observe, via our 3 and 4 coefficients, that adverse
selection increases during a match, and, further,
appears to spike during moments of importance, such
as tie-breaks. In other words, inside information is
being created during a match, and we propose that
this inside information accrues to traders observing
the action before the rest of the public.
There is reason to believe that the pictures viewed
on television are delayed with respect to viewing the
action live. For television pictures to be transmitted,
the images must be encoded, processed and then
transmitted to the host broadcaster for further
processing. They can then be transmitted to the
home audience, or by satellite to other broadcasters
Table 2. The results of the OLS estimation of Equation 2 for assets 1 to 4
1 2 3 4
0 1.117e03*** 1.318e03*** 4.380e04 1.084e03**
(52e16) (52e16) (0.12576) (0.001255)
1 7.236e01*** 7.691e01*** 9.303e01*** 9.355e01***
(52e16) (52e16) (52e16) (52e16)
2 7.112e10*** 3.128e09*** 1.084e08 1.541e07**
(2.62e06) (52e16) (0.42213) (0.00769)
3 5.796e04*** 1.509e04** 1.131e03** 5.640e04*
(52e16) (0.007) (0.001205) (0.045465)
4 1.067e03*** 1.584e03*** 4.809e03*** 6.035e03***
(52e16) (52e16) (52e16) (52e16)
5 2.751e04** 2.817e04* 8.338e05 3.459e05
(0.0087) (0.0218) (0.446775) (0.4847)
Adj.R2 0.5714 0.6457 0.8831 0.8876
Notes: One-sided p-values are given in parentheses.
*, ** and *** signals significance at the 5, 1 and 0.1% levels, respectively.
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around the world. Although information is not
available on the delay in this particular instance, the
delay may be significant even for those watching the
event in the host country. If a bettor has a mobile
device at the game, which would appear rather
inconspicuous amongst the crowd, then information
can be relayed to a computer instructed to trade
algorithmically.
It must be acknowledged that our evidence for
in-play insider trading is the fact that liquidity
providers take mitigating actions to offset losses to
such insiders. It may be argued that this evidence is
circumstantial. Our approach, however, is in good
company. In Shin (1993), the level of insider trading
is inferred from the overround that a bookmaker
charges on a series of horse races. The overround is
the extent to which is the sum of the implied win
probabilities of all the horses exceeds 100%. This is
the margin that the bookmaker claims. This margin,
much like the bid–ask spread charged on a betting
exchange, is the action that an intermediary takes to
offset losses to those with private information.
Another issue is that Betfair does attempt to nullify
the private information that accrues to those with a
viewing advantage. For in-play markets there is a 1–5
second window (after a bet is matched) during which
a liquidity provider can cancel the offer.8 The length
of the window depends on the company’s estimation
of the delay in television transmission. The aim of this
window is precisely to deter trading on private
information during a match. Our results, however,
suggest that this window is either insufficient to
remove the viewing advantage, or at least is perceived
by those providing liquidity to be insufficient.
Our general results on the nature of informed
trading differ slightly from those carried out on
financial markets. Lee et al. (1993), Krinsky and Lee
(1996) and Gajewski (1999) find equal or greater
support for Hypothesis 2, as for Hypothesis 1.
A possible reason for this may lie in the different
environment within which we test. There may be
greater scope for detailed analysis of earnings
announcements in a financial market than there is
for the outcome of a tie-break in a tennis match.
Although we would argue that a sophisticated bettor
could calculate the conditional probability of a player
winning, given the outcome of the last set, this does
not correspond with our conversations with book-
makers. Although detailed statistical analysis is
carried out prior to a match, in-play pricing is often
determined by the bookmaker’s ‘feeling’ on a game,
whilst observing competitor’s pricing to ensure that
an arbitrage is not available. If a bookmaker believes
that there is little to be gained from detailed statistical
analysis, it is unlikely that those providing liquidity
on a betting exchange will feel the need to guard
against other bettors using such analysis.
The task confronting bettors may just be simpler
than that confronting a stock market trader. The
odds quoted on a player to win are easily interpreted
as the implied probability of such an outcome. The
efficient value of a stock, on the other hand, is the
present value of all future returns, whether that be
dividend payouts or capital gains. Analysing the
effect of a company earnings announcement on such
returns is therefore a complicated task.
A second possible explanation is the relative
novelty of in-play betting exchanges. Although
private information has been gathered, and some-
times created, on the outcome of sporting events for a
long period, the possibility of trading in-play has only
emerged in the last decade. As a result, returns from
the possession of in-play inside information may be at
an early and bountiful stage, if competition is low.
Once the market develops, and opportunities dimin-
ish, it may be that informed bettors will follow
financial market professionals and develop an
alternative advantage via analytical techniques.
IV. Conclusion
In this article we have set out to answer a fundamen-
tal question in market microstructure: whether
‘informed’ traders derive their advantage from
access to inside information, or due to a superior
ability to process public information. For this
purpose we took data from a sports betting exchange
during play. Uniquely, this allowed us to time-stamp
information events to the nearest second, and to
ensure that we were observing all relevant informa-
tion regarding the value of an asset. We found
evidence of inside information but not of a superior
ability to process public information. As traditional
types of betting inside information (such as knowl-
edge of the player’s fitness) become stale once a
match begins, our findings suggest that a subset of the
betting population is creating its own inside infor-
mation by observing the action before the wider
public (possibly due to delays in the television signal),
and betting using this informational advantage. To
capitalize on this fleeting advantage, bettors would
need to feed this information into a computer and
initiate bets via an algorithm. In these circumstances,
8 See http://help.betfair.com/contents/itemId/i65767339/index.en.html.
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a high-frequency trading strategy (e.g. trading after
each point) would generate significant returns.
In the UK, the speed of television transmission
differs substantially between those channels trans-
mitted terrestrially, and those transmitted by satellite.
The terrestrial transmission is noticeably faster. In
2008, the Wimbledon Final was televized on BBC1
which is available on terrestrial television. Most of
the tennis played during the year, however, is only
available on satellite television. This creates the
possibility that the effect we have observed here
may be more pronounced elsewhere.
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